2026-11-17

Interpretation of Core Corporate Compliance Issues under the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law

Author:Zheng Chen

Introduction

On November 6, 2026, the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress voted to adopt the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law of the People’s Republic of China. Comprising six chapters and 47 articles, it shall take effect upon promulgation. This Law is China’s first dedicated legislation governing cross-border anti-corruption. Previously, relevant provisions were scattered across the Supervision Law, Criminal Law, International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law and other statutes. There lacked systematic arrangements for procedures such as lead transfer, reporting, international law enforcement and judicial cooperation, coordination with investigations by relevant entities, and fugitive repatriation and asset recovery. This Law consolidates the above rules into a specialized system integrating punishment, prevention and countermeasures. With the expansion of overseas asset scale, integrity in operation is no longer merely a matter of corporate self-regulation; it also bears on the stability of overseas operations and international competitiveness.

01 Main Subjects Subject to the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law

The Law defines subjects in two tiers. The first tier consists of compliance obligation subjects, defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 29. Chapter Four prescribes relevant obligations, and Article 45 imposes independent administrative liability, which applies regardless of whether the enterprise has committed corrupt acts. The second tier covers subjects bearing liability for acts and procedures. Article 2 defines the scope of relevant acts; Articles 35 to 44 set forth criminal, administrative, disciplinary and civil liabilities; Paragraph 2 of Articles 17 and 25 impose additional procedural obligations. The two tiers intersect but do not overlap; a single entity may fall within only one tier.

Tier One: Compliance Obligation Subjects

1. Domestic enterprises with institutions or investments overseas. Domestic enterprises that establish branches, subsidiaries or conduct investment activities overseas constitute the core subjects for Chapter Four compliance obligations. Their identification is not limited by ownership type, industry or scale. Business arrangements featuring long industrial chains, numerous overseas approval procedures and deep involvement of local third parties increase the difficulty of performing due diligence and record-keeping obligations, yet such factors do not serve as prerequisites for applicability. Article 10 only requires enhanced supervision over industries prone to cross-border corruption, without naming specific sectors. No industry list shall be construed as a statutory classification.

2. Institutions established in China by foreign enterprises. Paragraph 2 of Article 29 classifies branches and subsidiaries set up in China by foreign enterprises as enterprises engaged in cross-border business operations, which bear Chapter Four obligations equal to those of domestic enterprises conducting outbound investment. In terms of jurisdiction over bribery acts, domestically registered subsidiaries qualify as domestic enterprises and fall under the preceding clause of Item (1), Article 2; branches established in China by foreign enterprises fall under the subsequent clause of that Item. Bribery offered to domestic public officials and their specific related persons, or to state organs, state-owned enterprises, public institutions and people’s organizations, falls under Item (2). Whether the recipient of the bribe is a domestic or foreign public official does not determine the existence of jurisdiction.

3. State-owned enterprises and their overseas assigned personnel. State-owned enterprises fall within the first tier of compliance obligation subjects. Paragraph 2 of Article 31 imposes stricter requirements: strengthening integrity risk prevention and control for key overseas posts, major funds and major projects, and adopting measures in accordance with relevant provisions such as direct appointment of overseas financial principals, rotation of stationed personnel, and avoidance of conflicts of interest. Overseas assigned personnel may also fall under the second tier. Where they commit embezzlement, bribery, benefit transfer, abuse of power or other acts overseas, application of Item (3), Article 2 shall be assessed. If such acts constitute crimes under the Criminal Law, criminal liability shall be pursued under Article 35; those who are public officials shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions under Article 37. Determination of whether a crime is committed still requires case-by-case assessment based on constituent elements and jurisdictional rules in the specific provisions of the Criminal Law.

Tier Two: Subjects with Act-Related and Procedural Liabilities

1. Third-party institutions and relevant personnel. Agents, distributors, consulting advisors, intermediaries, customs brokers and other third parties have dual status. They are targets of corporate due diligence, supervision and management required by Article 33, and may also be deemed other organizations and individuals referred to in Articles 35 and 41. Where they jointly commit, instigate or assist in committing bribery, they shall bear liability respectively in accordance with their roles in the joint illegal act or joint crime. Article 33 also prohibits using third-party institutions or individuals to commit cross-border corruption. Independent commission of corruption by third parties does not automatically exempt the enterprise from its own compliance liability.

2. Collaborative subjects in the fund monitoring chain. Article 13 stipulates that anti-money laundering administrative authorities and other departments and institutions statutorily responsible for anti-money laundering supervision shall guide financial institutions and specific non-financial institutions to strengthen monitoring of cross-border funds. Where anti-money laundering administrative authorities of the State Council or their dispatched agencies at or above the prefectural level discover suspicious transaction activities suspected of cross-border corruption, they may conduct investigations in accordance with law and promptly transfer case leads and relevant evidentiary materials to supervisory organs and public security organs. Such entities are collaborative parties in fund monitoring and lead transfer; they are neither compliance obligation subjects defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 29 nor accountability targets under Article 45 merely by virtue of this Article.

3. Recipient-side bribery, blocking rules and procedural subjects. While enumerating bribery offered to domestic public officials and their specific related persons, as well as to state organs, state-owned enterprises, public institutions and people’s organizations, Item (2), Article 2 incorporates associated bribery-receiving conduct. Article 37 prescribes disciplinary sanctions for public officials, as well as public officials among liable leading persons and directly responsible persons in enterprises and other organizations. Paragraph 2 of Article 25 binds institutions, organizations and individuals within China: without consent from relevant Chinese authorities, they shall not provide evidentiary materials, data information or other relevant assistance to overseas institutions, organizations or individuals. Its coverage extends beyond any category of enterprises. Domestic entities directly sending internal investigation reports, employee emails and transaction data to overseas headquarters may trigger this provision. Article 17 imposes an obligation on relevant organizations and individuals to cooperate with investigations and truthfully provide evidence. When handling major cases, foreign enterprises, other organizations and individuals may be required to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity. Persons suspected of corruption listed in Item (5), Article 2, and persons refusing to provide evidence, concealing, falsifying or destroying evidence, or refusing or obstructing investigations specified in Article 44, are all within the scope of liability under this Law.

02 Key Matters Requiring Corporate Attention

(I) Compliance obligations upgraded from self-regulatory commitments to statutory duties

Anti-corruption compliance was previously largely viewed as corporate self-regulation. Article 45 establishes an independent accountability mechanism for failure to perform integrity compliance obligations: an order to rectify within a time limit shall first be issued; where rectification is refused, authorities may order suspension of relevant business operations, shutdown for rectification, or even revocation of relevant business licenses. Articles 29 to 34 set forth full-cycle requirements for establishing and improving integrity compliance management systems. Domestic enterprises shall reasonably set up integrity compliance departments or personnel according to corporate scale, business scope, risk prevention and control factors, and may assign integrity compliance officers to overseas institutions.

(II) Due diligence and unified management of third-party institutions

Funds in overseas business often circulate through third parties including agents, distributors, consulting advisors, customs brokers and travel agencies. Judging from publicly available law enforcement and judgment documents, bribe funds are mostly paid via third parties in the name of commissions, channel fees, consulting fees and marketing promotion fees. Targeting this link, Article 33 requires due diligence and supervision over retained third-party institutions or individuals, mandates their compliance with corporate integrity codes of conduct, and expressly prohibits use of third parties to commit cross-border corruption. Paragraph 2 of Article 33 further requires domestic enterprises to ensure their overseas branches and subsidiaries implement unified third-party management systems. Agents locally appointed by overseas subsidiaries are also included within the parent company’s due diligence and supervision scope. In practice, the following circumstances shall be prioritized for verification: commission rates obviously higher than local market levels, agents declining to disclose ultimate recipients in writing, inconsistent payment destinations and places of business, and changes to receiving accounts mid-performance.

(III) Truthfulness and completeness of accounting materials

Article 32 requires enterprises to guarantee the truthfulness and completeness of accounting vouchers, accounting books and financial accounting reports for cross-border operations, and prohibits using financial and accounting means to commit, cover up or conceal cross-border corruption. Common tactics to present bribe funds as normal operating expenditures on the books include inflating transaction links, fabricating consulting services, and cashing out funds through conference and travel expenses. The case of Li in Case Two of Part Three involved inflating transaction links and arranging affiliated companies to receive commissions. The authenticity of accounting materials constitutes not only an external statutory obligation but also critical evidence for enterprises to prove the actual operation of their compliance systems in future proceedings.

(IV) Internal reporting and lead transfer

Article 31 requires enterprises to identify and assess integrity risks, improve internal reporting mechanisms, and report suspected cross-border corruption issues to supervisory organs, public security organs and other competent authorities in accordance with law upon discovery. Case leads are not limited to internal corporate sources. Anti-money laundering authorities monitor cross-border funds under Article 13; audit, fiscal, tax and financial regulatory authorities transfer leads upon detecting fund anomalies during inspections under Article 14; customs also notify information on cash carried across borders. Where internal reporting channels fail to operate effectively, enterprises may learn of relevant matters at a late stage when employees report directly to authorities. Article 28 prescribes confidentiality, rewards and protection for internal whistleblowers in accordance with law.

(V) Domestic institutions’ cooperation obligations and blocking of data export

Regarding cooperation obligations: Article 17 stipulates that when handling cross-border corruption cases, supervisory organs, public security organs and others have the power to inquire of relevant organizations and individuals and collect and obtain evidence, and relevant organizations and individuals shall cooperate. For major cases, foreign enterprises, other organizations and individuals may also be required to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity. Article 44 separately classifies refusal to provide evidence, concealment, falsification or destruction of evidence, and refusal or obstruction of investigations as illegal acts, which may trigger public security administration penalties and even criminal liability.

Regarding blocking requirements: Paragraph 2 of Article 25 provides that overseas institutions, organizations and individuals shall not conduct anti-corruption investigations or other law enforcement activities within China without consent from relevant Chinese authorities; institutions, organizations and individuals within China shall not provide evidentiary materials, data information or other relevant assistance to overseas institutions, organizations and individuals.

Where legal counsel at overseas headquarters or foreign law enforcement agencies require domestic subsidiaries to submit internal investigation reports, employee emails and transaction data, provision without consent from relevant Chinese authorities may violate Paragraph 2 of Article 25. Failure to respond to letters from foreign law enforcement agencies may in turn breach local laws. Enterprises should suspend external provision, assess compliance against legal requirements of both jurisdictions, seek professional advice when necessary and communicate with competent authorities, instead of directly providing materials as requested by overseas headquarters.

03 Typical Scenarios and Handling Approaches

Notes on Cases in this Section

This Law does not create new criminal offences or prescribe new penalties or ranges of property penalties. Substantive liability remains governed by existing norms including the Criminal Law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Supervision Law, Public Servant Administrative Sanction Law, Company Law, Securities Law, Anti-Money Laundering Law, International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law and Data Security Law. The following cases were adjudicated under laws effective at the time of the conduct and are not judgments rendered under this Law. Their significance lies in illustrating similar behavioral patterns and additional layers of evaluation applicable to corresponding facts after this Law takes effect.

Case 1: Direct Payments to Foreign Public Officials (Case of Xi and Zhou)

Between 2017 and 2019, Xi, General Manager of the Singapore branch of a group company, together with Zhou, Deputy General Manager, offered bribes totaling SGD 220,000 to Singapore public officials on three occasions to seek improper commercial benefits. Xi also accepted RMB 1.92 million in bribes domestically. The court sentenced Xi to fixed-term imprisonment of two years and a fine of RMB 100,000 for the crime of bribery, and fixed-term imprisonment of four years and a fine of RMB 200,000 for the crime of taking bribes; combined punishment was fixed-term imprisonment of five years and a fine of RMB 300,000. Zhou was sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of two years and a fine of RMB 100,000.

This conduct triggers assessment for application of Item (1), Article 2. If similar facts occur after the entry into force of this Law, in addition to the criminal liability adjudicated in the original judgment, review shall also be conducted to determine whether the enterprise urged and guided its overseas branches and subsidiaries under Article 29, established a compliance system and assigned integrity compliance officers under Article 30, ensured true and complete accounting materials under Article 32, and conducted due diligence on involved third parties under Article 33. Failure to perform the above obligations may independently initiate procedures under Article 45 ranging from orders for rectification within a time limit up to revocation of relevant business licenses, regardless of whether such payment has been confirmed to constitute a crime. Article 36 further extends administrative penalties to directly responsible persons in charge and other directly liable persons.

Case 2: Commissions in Overseas Projects, Collection by Affiliated Companies and Overseas Control of State-Owned Enterprises

Li, former Deputy Party Secretary and General Manager of a state-owned oil enterprise, exploited multiple positions between 1996 and 2023 to assist relevant enterprises and individuals in matters such as business agency and product sales, and illegally accepted property equivalent to over RMB 67.94 million directly or through others. He was sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of fourteen years and a fine of RMB 3 million for the crime of taking bribes, and bribes and their fruits were recovered.

This case features prominent foreign-related elements: over 83% of illicit funds originated overseas, received, circulated and held by business persons abroad. Overseas investigation and evidence collection involved ten countries and regions. Tactics included inflating transaction links, arranging affiliated companies to collect intermediary commissions to disguise benefit transfers, channeling funds through offshore companies and offshore accounts via banks in multiple countries and regions, and long-term payment of obviously unreasonable high commissions to foreign agents for overseas projects. Ultimately, key overseas evidence was obtained and all overseas illicit funds fully recovered through international criminal judicial assistance and law enforcement cooperation.

The cross-border links involved in this case will have an additional evaluation layer under this Law. Involvement of overseas agents, overseas receipt and safekeeping of illicit funds, and cross-border asset circulation respectively trigger assessment for application of Items (2), (3) and (5), Article 2. Specific characterization must still be determined based on case facts and substantive laws effective at that time and shall not change merely by virtue of definitional clauses in this Law. For state-owned enterprises, Paragraph 2 of Article 31 codifies statutory obligations including direct appointment of overseas financial principals, rotation of stationed personnel and conflict-of-interest avoidance. Article 32 requires truthful and complete accounting vouchers, books and reports and strengthens internal audits. Article 33 mandates due diligence and supervision over retained third-party institutions or individuals. Articles 23 and 24 codify fugitive repatriation and asset recovery, which were accomplished through international cooperation in this case, as statutory channels.

Case 3: Bribery through Third Parties by China-Based Institutions of Foreign Enterprises (Case of a Multinational Pharmaceutical Enterprise’s China Investment Company)

The defendant entity, a China investment company of a multinational pharmaceutical enterprise, adopted a bribery sales model to expand drug sales and seek improper benefits. Using channels such as travel agencies, it offered bribes in various forms to non-state personnel engaged in medical work at medical institutions across multiple regions in huge amounts. Corporate senior management, as directly responsible persons in charge, organized, promoted and implemented the scheme. The defendant entity was convicted of the crime of offering bribes to non-state personnel under Paragraph 1, Article 164 of the Criminal Law and fined RMB 3 billion. Five senior executives were respectively sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of two to three years with probation of two to four years. The legal representative, a British national, was additionally subject to deportation.

One boundary requires clarification. This case was characterized as domestic commercial bribery under laws effective at the time of conduct and does not constitute cross-border corruption listed in Article 2 of this Law, and thus cannot be cited as a judgment rendered under this Law. Nevertheless, the defendant entity is a subsidiary established in China by a foreign enterprise as defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 29. Regardless of whether cross-border corruption occurs, it qualifies as a subject bearing Chapter Four compliance obligations. If similar facts arise after this Law takes effect, in addition to the charges in the original judgment, the enterprise will also be subject to Article 32 prohibiting use of financial and accounting means to commit, conceal or cover up misconduct, Article 33 requiring third-party due diligence, supervision and prohibition against use of third parties, Article 30 requiring timely investigation and handling of violations, and independent administrative liability under Article 45.

Case 4: Cross-Border Transfer of Corrupt Assets and Asset Recovery (Embezzlement Case of Li, Former Section Chief of Poyang County Finance Bureau)

Between 2006 and 2010, Li, former Section Chief of Poyang County Finance Bureau in Jiangxi Province, together with others, defrauded RMB 94 million in infrastructure special funds, of which over RMB 29.53 million was transferred to Singapore before he absconded. On March 3, 2015, the Shangrao Intermediate People’s Court ruled to forfeit SGD 5.4 million of illegal gains he transferred to Singapore. On June 29, 2016, the High Court of Singapore ordered full return of seized assets to China. Li was repatriated to China on May 9, 2015. On January 23, 2017, the Shangrao Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Li to life imprisonment for embezzlement, deprivation of political rights for life, and confiscation of all his personal property, with remaining illicit funds subject to continued recovery. This was the first case applying the confiscation procedure for illegal gains after such procedure was added to the Criminal Procedure Law.

Against the institutional framework after this Law enters into force, statutory tools are available to address cross-border asset transfer involved in this case. Item (5), Article 2 directly incorporates flight of corruption suspects overseas and cross-border transfer of corrupt assets into the definition of cross-border corruption, rather than treating them merely as subsequent circumstances of predicate offences. Article 18 covers exit restriction; Article 23 governs extradition, transfer of sentenced persons, repatriation and overseas prosecution; Article 24 prescribes the confiscation procedure for illegal gains, orders for restitution, asset return and sharing cooperation; Article 40 governs confiscation, recovery and restitution of illegal criminal gains and their fruits and proceeds. These provisions consolidate measures implemented in this case via special procedures of the Criminal Procedure Law and international judicial assistance into statutory tools. Credit records and practice restrictions under Article 39, and voluntary surrender and truthful confession under Article 43, also echo the post-arrest disposition in this case.

Conclusion

The significance of this Law lies not in creating new offences or increasing penalties, but in converting integrity management requirements previously scattered across internal policies, industry practices and case-specific responses into statutory duties subject to direct supervision and inspection by competent authorities, paired with administrative liability independent of the corrupt acts themselves. Conviction and sentencing remain based on the Criminal Law and relevant statutes. Changes occur before cases enter criminal proceedings: whether systems are established, whether third parties undergo due diligence, whether accounting materials are truthful, whether leads are transferred in accordance with law, and whether requests for overseas evidence collection are approved, will now be separately evaluated.

Supporting guidelines and industry mechanisms remain to be issued successively, and applicable precedents for reference will not emerge in the short term. What enterprises can do at present is: first confirm whether they qualify as compliance obligation subjects under Paragraph 2 of Article 29; then verify cross-border connections in existing business item by item under Article 2; next inspect whether paths for document and data outflow to overseas comply with Paragraph 2 of Article 25; and implement three systems – third-party management, accounting materials and internal reporting – to a traceable execution standard. The foregoing work does not presuppose existing problems, and rectification procedures under Article 45 may also be initiated regardless of whether corruption has occurred.


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